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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RUTH :31. DIXON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
7645

-vs.-

WILLIAM D. DIXON,
Defendant an.d Appellant.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the
defendant for a divorce, a property settlement and custody of the three minor children. Defendant's attorney
filed a demurrer to the complaint, but later withdrew it
and defendant consented that his default be entered. No
answer was filed by the defendant.
In her complaint filed May 28, 1948 (T-4), in addition to asking for the custody of the children she asked
that she be awarded title to an auto tourist camp in
Vernal, Utah, which the parties had purchased in 1946
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for the sum of $10,000.00 of which sum $5,000.00 \vas to
be paid as a down payment and thereafter $1,000.00 a
year until the balance had been paid in full with interest
at 6% per annum. The down payment was made in 1946
and one payment of $1,000.00 was made in 1947, and that
at the time the complaint was :filed there \vas a balance
due and owing of $4,000.00 on a mortgage in favor cf
the Bank of Vernal. The complaint further asked that
the defendant be required to pay off the balance of the
indebtedness on the real estate. She also asked for the
household furniture used in one of the cabins for a home
for the family and the furniture and equipment in the
other cabins and all other personal property they had
accumulated except one vVhite Truck which the defendant
used in his work as a plumber and steam fitter.
The original decree was entered ( T -9) on the 28th
day of September, 1948, giving her the custody of the
children and $75.00 a month for their support. In distributing the property the court awarded her all of the
personal property except the truck and also the tourist
cabins in lieu of alimony and defendant was to quit claim
all his right, title and interest to her subject to the
mortgage and other indebtedness on the cabins, but that
in the event that plaintiff defaults in making the payments on the mortgage and other indebtedness secured
by the real estate then the defendant had the right to
pay off the indebtedness, take over the cabins and plaintiff was to give a quit claim deed of all her right, title
nnd interest in the cabins to the defendant.

2
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In :Jiny of 1949, defendant filed a petition ( T-1) to
modify the decree alleging that the plaintiff had defaulted in her payments of insurance, interest and principal on the mortgage and defendant demanded that he
be R\Yarded the title to the cabins under the terms of the
original decree and that the plaintiff be required to give
him a quit claim deed to all her right, title and interest
in said real estate.
The petition further alleged that on account of
plaintiff's mental and physical condition that she had
been unable to manage the cabins that she had incurred
further indebtedness on the cabins and that if he had
not paid off the indebtedness the property would have
been lost.
He further alleged that she was not in a physical or
mental condition to take care of the children and also
asked that they be awarded to him with right of visitation. He also asked that she be awarded the sum of
$50.00 a month for her support and maintenance when
she did not have the children. There was no answer on
cross petition or affidavits filed by the said plaintiff to
said petition and an order was made June 24, 1949 (T-15)
setting a hearing on the petition for the 8th day of July,
1949, and that a notice was served upon her and her
attorney requiring her to appear before the court on
that date.
The parties were in court on that day, but it is difficult to determine just what took place because of the
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discrepancies between the court reporter's notes and the
order modifying the decree (T-17) which was subsequently filed.
On August 30, 1950, the plaintiff filed a petition
( T -22) to modify the decree ''for the return of the
property awarded plaintiff and the custody of the minor
children in accordance with the terms of the original
decree of divorce and for other relief."
On September 15, 1950, defendant filed an answer
to the petition (T-26) of plaintiff to modify the petition
and asked the same to be denied. It was on the issues
joined in the petition and answer that a hearing was
held on the 28th day of September, 1950. It is from the
Findings and Decision made and entered by the ~ourt
on the 22nd day of November, 1950, following the hearing
that this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The appellant relies upon the following errors for
a reversal of the judgment rendered in this case.
POINT ONE
That the Trial Court erred in making Findings number 3, 4, and 5 (T-63), to the effect that the formal order
of modification, signed by one of the Judges of the court
on March 8, 1950, did not conform to the purported
minute entry and that the so called minute entry is con4
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trolling, and that the formal order was of no legal effect
and therefore, null and void, for the reason that the so
called minute entry "Tas not controlling as a matter of
la"T in Yie'Y of the fact that a formal order of modification 'Yas signed, made and entered by the court.
POINT TWO
That the court erred by receding from his position
at the trial of the case that the formal order of modification signed March 8, 1950, was res adjudicata for the
reason that the defendant "ras precluded by the ruling
of the court from offering any evidence to show what
took place in the proceedings of the court on July 8, 1950.
POINT THREE
That the court erred in making any modification of
the previous order at the time of the hearing on November 4, 1950, upon the petition of the plaintiff and answer
of defendant for the reason that as a matter of law the
evidence presented was insufficient to show any material
changes in the circumstances of the parties to warrant
a modification of the decree as modified.
POINT FOUR
That the court erred in making its calculations of
the respective interests of the parties in the real estate
as set forth in Finding 8 and 9 (T-64) to the extent of
$1,000.00.
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POINT FIVE
That the court erred in making its calculations of
the amount of money defendant paid in clearing up the
indebtedness of the real property in the sum of $730.00
as set forth in Finding 10 and 11 (T-64 and 65).

POINT SIX
That the court erred in making Finding number 13
(T-65) in which the court required defendant to secure
payment of purported judgment in the sum of $8,400.00
by obtaining a life insurance policy in the sum of
$5,000.00 making the plaintiff the sole beneficiary and
to keep said policy in full force and effect until said
judgment was paid in full for the reason that there is no
evidence in the record to show that the defendant would
be physically able to obtain such a policy, what the premiums would be at his age and whether he is financially
able to carry such a policy.

ARGUMENT
Point One
That the Trial Court Erred in Making Findings Number
3, 4, and 5, (T-63) to the Effect That the Formal Order of
Modification, Signed by One of the Judges of the Court on
March 8, 1950, Did Not Conform to the Purported Minute
Orde~r and That the So Called Minute Order is Controlling,
and That the Formal Order Was of No Legal Effect and
Therefore, Null and Void For the Reason That the So Called
Minute Orde~r Was Not Controlling As a Matter of Law in
View of the Fact That a Formal Order of Modification Was
Signed, Made and Entered By the Court.
6
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Under this assignment it is the contention of the
defendant that the formal order made and entered
:Jiarrh 8, 1950, 'Yas the ronrt 's decision and judgment
and that it superseded any minute entry 'vhich was after"~ards made a part of the record in this case.
In the case of Canadian and A Mortgage Trust
Company rs. Clarita Land and Investment Cornpany, 71
Pac. 301, it \\'"as held that a minute entry by the court
directing that findings and derree be drawn in favor of
defendants did not constitute the decision of the court
nor prevent it from subsequently rendering a decision
for plaintiff and against certain defendants in default.
It 'vas also held in McConville vs. Superior Court
of Los Angeles, 248 Pac. 553, that a formal order of the
rourt constitutes statement of court's decision and supersedes a minute entry of court's decision.
In Neblett vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 194
Pac. 2nd, page 22, the reviewing court held that the findings and conclusion of law signed by the trial judge
constitutes the court's decision and supersedes any
prior minute entry directed to be entered by the trial
court.
In Kansas City Pump Company vs. Jones, 104 S. W.
1136, the Court said-that minute entries are a memorial
of the court's action, but the judgment itself "is the
judicial act of the court in pronouncing the law upon
the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings
and the verdict.''
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McConville vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles,
248 P. 553.
ICreisel vs. Snavley, 115 S. W. 1059.
In the defendant's petition (T-1) to modify the
original decree and give force and effect to some of its
provisions he set forth, that the plaintiff had defaulted
under the conditions imposed upon her by the decree
failing to pay the insurance, the interest and the balance
of the principal $3,500.00 and in accordance with the
decree asked that it be modified awarding him the real
estate because he had paid the indebtedness on the propc~rty and 'vas entitled to a quit claim deed from the plaintiff. He also asked for the oustody of the children on the
grounds that the plaintiff was mentally and physically
ill ; that she ''"'as not able to take care of the children
and was neglecting them and that he had established a
residence vlith his mother in Payson who was willing
and able to assist him in caring for said children while
he was at work. He also asked the court to a"\\"ard her
$50.00 a month for the support and maintenance of herself when she did not have the custody of the children.
There was no cross petition or counter affidavit filed by
the plaintiff and that the court issued an order on June
24, 1949, setting the hearing for the 8th day of July, 1949.
There was a hearing on that date \Vi th the parties and
their attorneys and apparently from the stenographer's
notes there was some testimony given and stipulations
entered into. When the formal order which was dated
July 8, 1949 was presented to the court for his signature
on March 8, 1950, the first date was apparently changed
8
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bY
. the J udg;e, but the decree did not conform to the
stenographer ,s notes "·hich "\Yere later reduced to writing and made a part of the record and the provisions in
the formal order 'Yere different from the previous intention of the court.
~

Both the plaintiff and defendant 'Yere precluded by
the court from going back of the formal order to show
'Yhat took place at the proceedings.
It is the further contention of the defendant that the
petition of the plaintiff ( T -35) to modify the decree and
replace the same in accordance "\vith the terms contained in the original decree of divorce'' did not give
the plaintiff the right to re-open the judgment or authorize amendment by petition. The only remedy that the
plaintiff had at that time was to either make a motion
for a ne"\v trial or appeal from the formal judgment.
H

Errors of court alone can be corrected only by appeal from judgment or motion for a new trial or other
statutory· motions.
Reichert

YS.

Robun, 265 Pac. 260.

In another case McKan.ney vs. McKanney, 230 Pac.
218, that an error of law upon which a decision of judgment rests cannot after entry of judgment be reviewed
and rectified by trial court summarily or on motion, but
can only be revie,v·ed by granting a new trial on an
appeal.
The legislature in adopting Section 40-3-5 of the
lT.C ..A. 1943, relaxed in divorce proceedings the rules
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of law calculated to maintain the sanctity and stability
of judgments. But it is the general rule that sanctity
and stability must be given to judgments and they should
not be disturbed except for cogent and controlling
reasons.
In Fla.milton vs. Ha;milton, 89 Utah, 554; 58 Pac. 2nd
11, this court says ''that the power of District Courts
to make amendments in the particulars authorized by
this Section 40-3-5 U.C.A. 1943 is not without limit, and
that in the absence of changed conditions or circumstances a modification cannot be had.''
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah, 456; 154 Pac. 952.
Tribe vs. Tribe, 59 Utah, 112; 202 Pac. 213.
Chaffe vs. Chaffe, 63 Utah, 261 ; 225 Pac. 27.
It is to be noted that in the petition of the plaintiff
filed the 30th day of August 1950, she asked ''to modify
decree and replace the same in accordance w~th the terms
contained in the original decree of divorce and for other
relief.''
She charged in her last petition that the grounds
on which the modification was obtained that she ''"'as not
mentally or physically ill that such statement was untrue, had no basis in fact whatsoever, and that said
petition was based upon a false premise and no evidenee
was introduced that she was mentally incompetent or
physically unfit to take cars of her children or the property. She further charged that on July 9, 1949, the day
after the previous hearing at Vernal, Utah, that the
10
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defendant rame to her place of residence, forcibly took
the minor children into his possession and forcibly
removed or had plaintiff removed to the' State Mental
Hospital in ProYo, Utah. HoweYer, the uncontradicted
testimony sho,ved that her sister and brother-in-law
went to Vernal and forcibly put her in an automobile
and took her to the State ~Iental Hospital at Provo. The
evidence further showed that the defendant knew nothing
about this move and was in no way responsible for such
act and he did not know that she was in the State Mental
Hospital until after she had been there one month. When
she was released from the hospital she did not return to
Vernal, but went to Salt Lake City and lived with a
family by the name of Bekkemellon. Mrs. Bekkemelon
being her cousin. There was no evidence submitted regarding her requirements, no evidence to show that she
was in a position 'vhere she could take care of her
children and no change in circumstances which would
sustain the judgment rendered by the court.
Point Two
That the Court Erred By Receding From His Position
at the Trial of the Case That the Formal Order of Modification Signed March 8, 1950, Was Res Adjudicata For the
Reason That the Defendant Was Procluded By the Ruling
of the Court From Offering Any Evidence to Show What
Took Place in the Proceedings of the Court on July 8, 1950.

In cross-examining the plaintiff, defendant's counsel
began to open up the matter of the proceedings on the
8th of July 1949. The plaintiff was asked whether or not
she was ordered to appear on that date a~d she answered
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in the affirmative and when asked did you appear, the
court said,
"THE COURT: Mr. Roberts (rr-88), I wonder if we are concerned about that~ That isn't
a move to set aside that order modifying the decree. There is no attack upon the jurisdiction of
the Court in entering it.
(Argument.).
THE COURT: That's all res adjudicata (T88). This is no move to set aside that decree that
was entered. I stopped Mr. Shields from going
back of it, and I think I should stop you from
going back of it, because that decree now stands,
as modified by the modification order entered by
Judge Tuckett, on the day that was found in
examining the :files. So now our only question is:
Have there been· material changes· since the modification of the decree, 'vhich now warrant a modification of the decree as modified~ Is there any
doubt in counsel's mind about that~
MR. ROBERTS: Not a bit.
THE COURT: All right.''
This case was tried on the theory that the plaintiff
inust show material changes since the modification of
the decree which would warrant a modification of the
decree as modified. There was no testimony offered to
show any changes of circumstances or her requirements
that were different from when the original decree was
modified. The court receded from his position that the
modified decree was res adjudicata and set it aside in
its entirety and went back to the original decree and
modified that, and in his memorandum agreement ordered

12
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an entirely ne'v judgment 'vhich certainly was beyond
the pleadings and the issues raised at the hearing.
In Barlow vs. City of Inglewood, 197 Pac. 2nd, 721,
it 'vas held that the court had no power to vacate its
own judgment in order to correct an alleged judicial
error as distinguished from a clerical error.
There was also held in TT,. yllie vs. Kent, 152 Pac. 194,
that while the trial court may order that clerical mistakes
in the entry-of judgment be c.orrected to show the judgment pronounced, that judicial error can only be
reached by motion for new trial or appeal.
~Iartin

Ys. Ray, 170 Pac. 2nd, Page 75.

Holmes vs. Holmes, 211 Pac. 2nd 946.
Point Three
That the Court Erred in Making Any Modification of
the Previous Order at the Time of the Hearing on November 4, 1950, Upon the Petition of the Plaintiff and Answe~r
of Defendant For the Reaso·n That As a Matter of Law the
Evidence Presented Was Insufficien!t to Show Any Material
Changes in the Circumstances of the Parties to Warrant a
Modification of the Decree As Modified.

Very little testimony was offered at the hearing as
to any change in circumstances which would warrant a
modification of the decree as amended. She had been
living with a cousin in an apartment for several months
prior to the hearing. She gave birth to her child in
November of 1949 and had adopted it to the Bekkenmellons with "\vhom she lived. She had received $5,057.00
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( T-85) up to the time of the hearing from her mother's
estate. There was no testimony of what her intentions
were in regard to establishing a home or the conditions
of her health, so that it is apparent that the judgment
of the court went beyond the pleadings and issues presented and therefore must fall.
Point Four
That the Court Erred in Making Its Calculations of
the Respective Interests of the Parties in the Real Estate
As Set Forth in Finding 8 and 9 ( T -64) to the Extent of
$1,000.00.

In Finding 8 and 9, it is set forth that $2,000.00 was
paid for the year 1947 and 1948. One thousand dollars
was paid in 1947, making $6,000.00 which had been paid
and the balance of the purchase price in 1948 was
$4,000.00 represented by promissory notes secured by
mortgage making up the $10,000.00. If there had been
$1,000.00 paid in 1948 it would have made the purchase
price $11,000.00. The plaintiff went in possession of the
cabins under the original decree in September 1948, but
.she made no payments on the mortgage after that date.
Point Five
That the Court Erred in Making Its Calculations of
the Amount of Money Defendant Paid in Clearing Up the
Indebtedness of the Real PropeTty in the Sum of $730.00
As Set Forth in Finding 10 and 11 (T-64 and 65).

In the calculations of the court in determining how
much the defendant paid in clearing up the indebtedness
14
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on the I'eal property the rourt failed to give him credit
for $500.00 that 'Yas paid on the principal on the $4,000.00
note of $500.00, $60.00 interest on June 8, 1948, and
~GO.OO interest on September -!, 1948, $21.00 interest on
October ~9, 1948, and $39.00 interest in December 1948,
and $.)0.00 insurance in 1949, making a total of $730.00.
Point Six
That the Court Erred in Making Finding Numbe·r 13
(T-65) in Which the Court Required Defendant to Secure
Payment of Purported Judgment in the Sum of $8,400.00
By Obtaining a Life Insurance Policy in the Sum of $5,000.00
Making the Plaintiff the Sole Beneficiary and to Keep Said
Policy in Full Force and Eff.ect Until Said Judgment Was
Paid in Full For the Reason That There is No Evidence in
the Record to Show That the Defendant Would Be Physically Able To Obtain Such a Policy, What the Premiums
Would Be At His Age and Whether He is Financially Able
to Carry Such a Policy.

There was no evidence to support Finding No. 13 in
which the court required the defendant to obtain a
$5,000.00 life insurance policy to be issued in the name
of the plaintiff as beneficiary and to pay the premiums
until the judgment was paid in full. There was no evidence that he would be able to obtain such a policy at
his age or that he \vas financially able to pay the premiums on such a policy, and it is elementary law that
a Finding not based upon the pleadings and evidence
issues must fail.
In conclusion we submit that under the evidence
introduced in this case and under the argument and the
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authorities herein presented, the new decree should be
set aside and the former decree be declared in full force
and effect or have a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BEN E. ROBERTS,
Attorney for Defendant

16
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